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INTRODUCTION
Hans Lindahl’s new book Authority and the Globalisation of Inclusion
and Exclusion offers much to interest theorists of authority, legality, and
pluralism. Its core contribution builds an account of “asymmetrical
recognition” into a theory of authority to explain the interfaces and
interactions of emergent global legal orders. The concept of recognition,
Lindahl argues, “offers the most promising way of effecting passage from a
functional to a normative concept of authority”1 by emphasizing the relation
between assertions of authority on behalf of a collective, and the practices of
recognition that include and exclude both participants and strangers to that
collective. Lindahl’s work develops a model of authority in which ‘restrained
collective self-assertion’2 enables one represented collective to recognize
another without the “constraints of reciprocity”3 that are typically favored by
both universalist and particularist accounts of the authority claimed by global
legal orders.
Lindahl’s work is carefully and persuasively argued, first setting up a
functional account in which “authority is what authority does.”4 In this
account, authority is (and does) “the articulation, monitoring and
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1. HANS LINDAHL, AUTHORITY AND THE GLOBALISATION OF INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION 229
(2018).
2. Id. at 287.
3. Id. at 344.
4. Id. at 327.
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enforcement of the point of joint action”5 for a represented collective which
posits a legal order as its own. Lindahl then shows how demands for
recognition, both from those included in and those excluded by that ordering,
reveals the inadequacy of a strictly functional account of authority. A
functional account cannot answer the practical question about the limits of
its own commonality, or justify the practices of inclusion and exclusion in
which it engages. As the book progresses, Lindahl uses concrete examples
including alt-globalization movements and their claims for recognition of
alternative legal orders, to demonstrate that authoritative practices of setting
boundaries—which both include and exclude persons and their valued
activities—generate normative challenges to those orders’ claims to
commonality and to expectations of reciprocity. The latter part of the book
is then devoted to articulating Lindahl’s own theory in which the assertion
of authority on behalf of a collective can itself be restrained through practices
of deference, the suspension of claims to legal ordering, or other techniques
of engaging in asymmetrical rather than reciprocal practices of recognition.
Lindahl’s novel placement of asymmetrical recognition inside an
account of authority makes this book an original and important contribution
to the ongoing reconfiguration of theories of authority in the global context.
There is a great deal here with which I agree, but I will focus this comment
on two (related) matters arising from the way in which Lindahl regards the
‘inter’ of interaction between authorities representing collectives, which I
will term here the idea of ‘the middle’. This commentary then concludes with
observations about the implications for Lindahl’s effort to offer a functional
and normative account of authority that nevertheless stops short of full
normativity because it rejects any imposition of conditions laying claim to
the ‘the right or the good.’
The title of this commentary is not frivolous, despite being borrowed
from the contemporary radio airwaves.6 It poses a specific question that one
represented collective might ask of another, in the course of a legal ordering
that generates their interaction outside of either’s boundaries. I argue that
this question, ‘why don’t you just meet me in the middle?’ does not amount
to a collective self-assertion as Lindahl explains it in his pivotal account of
asymmetrical recognition set out in Chapter Six. In contrast, it is an invitation
that does not set out to control the interaction it generates, nor does it suspend
its own ordering in deference to the other.

5. Id. at 76.
6. The title, the formulation of ‘the middle,’ and its invitational question, are borrowed from my
children’s’ favorite pop song of the month in which the review symposium was held. See ZEDD, MAREN
MORRIS, GREY, THE MIDDLE (Interscope Records 2018).
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My core comment is that Lindahl’s account of recognition between
legal orders, and the ‘restrained collective self-assertion’ that is bound up in
the exercise of authority directed both inwards and outwards, serves to
illuminate only one (albeit broad and important) category of interactions that
may occur between legal orders.7 Thus the inclusion and exclusion of
Lindahl’s title capture two key incidents of interaction between collectives
(and their authorities), but do not exhaust the range of ways in which an
authority representing a collective inwards might also represent that
collective outwards into the abstract and concrete zones of interaction that
make up ‘the middle.’
It is important first to clarify that my questions for Lindahl are posed
within the account of authority that he favors, which I will characterize as a
‘functional+’ account. Lindahl defends the interaction of functional and
normative elements of authority, but steers away from fully normative
conceptions of authority, or examinations of its legitimacy. Lindahl is
concerned to examine authority not as the normative power to change
reasons (e.g. by imposing obligations upon subjects) or to govern in a manner
legitimated by subjects’ participation, but as the representation of a
collective that is putatively unified by the setting of default standards to be
asserted over insiders and outsiders.8 Lindahl’s work on the practices of
inclusion and exclusion that accompany such authoritative setting of
boundaries does not ask whether such practices would generate reasons for
those subject to their claims, nor whether they are justified in some other
way, nor indeed how any interactive practices among emergent authorities
in global legal orders might affect such justifications. Yet at the same time,
Lindahl carefully explains and argues that the representational claims
involved in the setting of boundaries, and the practices of recognition they
require, inevitably raise normative concerns (that are evidenced by the
contestation of those very boundaries). Indeed the whole point of infusing
the idea of recognition into the account of authority is to highlight the inbuilt normative implications of collective self-assertion. Lindahl argues,
however, that rich normative theories of the right or the good cannot escape
universalist tendencies which fail to recognize the other at all (either as
included in or excluded from the collective). His functional+ account instead
emphasizes that the key to understanding what authority does is the notion
7. Lindahl expressly limits the ambition of his own account and does not claim to offer a fullblown theory of authority amidst global legal orders. LINDAHL, supra note 1, at 30.
8. As Lindahl notes, he does not directly consider the implications of his thinking for a Razian
model of a normative power to change the reasons applying to a subject, in which subjection of the
individual as an individual is based on reasons between the authority and the individual subject (albeit in
light of his or her social relations including relations in a collective). Compare JOSEPH RAZ, THE
MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986), with JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW (2d ed. 1999).
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of order and ordering, involving (i) an assertion of the (revisable and
contingent) limits of what a collective will accept and what it will reject, as
well as (ii) the limits of what (and who) it will subject to legal ordering. At
the core of Lindahl’s functional+ notion, therefore, is not a normative claim
to change reasons, or in other ways legitimately govern, but a claim to
represent and then assert a putative collective’s standards and values.
Given this focus upon ordering (rather than its evaluation against some
standard of justification), the key to Lindahl’s account is the collective’s selfassertion, which harbors both representation and recognition.9 Assertion,
however, is just one way of understanding the idea that authority must be
somehow projected outwards. Normative theories of authority typically treat
the outward projection of authority as a claim to an entitlement to govern,
while functional accounts are concerned with assertions of effective
governance. Lindahl’s offering here falls into the latter category, but checks
it against the evaluative considerations that are imported by the ideas of
representation and recognition. This middle road thus invites the query
whether his explanation of assertion captures enough of the nuanced and
differently valuable ways in which authority may be projected, in light of
different forms and values of recognition and representation.
There are at least three distinctive ways in which to conceive of the
middle into which authorities project their forms of legal ordering. Two of
these, I argue, are not well captured by the account of ‘restrained collective
self-assertion’ that Lindahl offers.10 The first conceives of a space of activity
that is genuinely in between collectives (and their legal orders). This
imagines that there can be a space between what one collective recognizes
as the outward-facing boundaries of another collective, and what that other
collective asserts as its own boundaries. Lindahl’s notion of asymmetrical
recognition captures a difference between what each legal order projects as
its boundaries, but the resulting account of restrained collective selfassertion does not explain the content of what may happen in light of that
difference. Arguably, there may be a space or gap between the asserted limits
of each legal order, which is not necessarily a no man’s land where both sides
fear to tread (but which may usefully buffer between them). It might have an
altogether different atmosphere as an empty space of opportunity, which
neither side claims or operates as its own. In Lindahl’s terms, this may be a

9. See LINDAHL, supra note 1, at 195 (“[R]epresentation is the key to a concept of authority which
both includes and supersedes its purely functional interpretation . . . .”).
10. Lindahl suggests that “collective self-assertion covers the entire spectrum of responses to a
summons to action . . . .” Id. at 351. The core of my objection challenges this claim.
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space in which there is strong ‘a-legality’ on both sides,11 and yet still
triggers an interaction. (For example, this may be a way of reading the
highest-order relations of constitutional pluralism, or shared/deferred
sovereignties between collectives). Alternatively, it might be a space that is
rich in institutional forms belonging to neither order but able to adjudicate
or arbitrate between them (as in the case of the rules and institutions of public
international law). In either case, the space between belongs to neither nor is
within either’s asserted limits.
The second sort of middle has a different character and is important for
different reasons. It conceives of a space that is not vacant, belonging to
neither, but is rather an overlap – belonging to both. More precisely, an
overlap exists when persons are subject to more than authority,12 or in
Lindahl’s terms, are included in more than one representation of putative
collective unity.13 On a functional model of authority, such overlap would
arise whenever a person is in fact included by multiple authorities
representing (and ordering) different putative collectives and their
activities.14 For example, there may be functional boundary-settings that
generate overlap of legal orders even when there are points of conflict
between the authorities.
A third sense of the middle is the one powerfully captured in Lindahl’s
work. It is the sense of a meeting point, pivot, or other boundary at which
one collective’s self-assertion meets another’s. Lindahl carefully and
persuasively explains that asymmetries of recognition between collectives
(and their asserted limits) mean that these boundaries may not match in
content (one’s asserted limits might draw a line that does not match that of
its interlocutor). It is important to my argument here that the asymmetry is
not represented (at least not expressly) in Lindahl’s work as a juridical gap
11. See also HANS LINDAHL, FAULT LINES OF GLOBALIZATION: LEGAL ORDER AND THE POLITICS
work on a-legality here draws on this earlier work.
12. In my earlier work, I have set out an explanation of the differences between interaction and
overlap. That account however, like other points of comparison with Hans’ work, is differentiated by its
emphasis on the existence of legitimate authority, and its normative account of authority as a reasongiving power. It offers a roughly Razian alternative to Lindahl’s functional account offered here. In
places, this commentary will offer points of unity or conjecture between our work on authority, but a full
consideration of how the two may complement or conflict with one another is beyond the scope of the
present comment. Compare NICOLE ROUGHAN, AUTHORITIES: CONFLICTS, COOPERATION, AND
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY (2013).
13. See LINDAHL, supra note 2, at 109−10 (“A collective, i.e. the unity implied in we[] together, is
always a represented unity, a unity that is only given indirectly . . . . The contestability of claims to unity
entails that a collective is never fully a unity, hence never wholly identical to itself. In the process of
including those who are to view themselves as a collective self and excluding the rest as other-than-self,
representation brings other-than-self into the fold of collective selfhood: ‘not in our name.’”) (emphasis
in original).
14. And not by the existence of multiple authorities that are legitimate for the subject.
OF A-LEGALITY (2013). Lindahl’s
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or space in between legal ordering. It is instead two boundaries that are
treated as different but not distant; without a gap that needs to be bridged.
The question is whether Lindahl’s alternative model of authority—in
which restrained collective self-assertion involves asymmetrical recognition
of and by collectives—can include different kinds of projections of authority
to account for the range of options for interactions in these alternative
‘middle’ zones. The alternative projection that I think is missing from
Lindahl’s account is not assertive but invitational; not deferential but
cooperative. Its core acknowledges that there is something to be worked out,
or something at stake between the collectives, which is not subject to the
limits of either (a matter that is a-legal to both, in Lindahl’s terms).
Importantly, it cannot therefore be resolved through complete deference
because of the need for meeting in the middle, where both sides contribute
as their own polities require them to do, with each representing their
collective as a partner to a process that neither can conclude alone. Accepting
that such a practice may be somewhat unusual, and may be operated rarely,
the key question is whether such a practice is or can be consistent with (or
even part of) a claim to authority made by a collective’s representatives. If
so, it should be explicable within a model of authority in which the
globalization of inclusion and exclusion is also alert to possibilities of
generosity and a restraint from asserting oneself at all.
The question for Lindahl is: can legal ordering countenance these other
kinds of middles where there is either overlap or interaction that takes the
form of invitations issued and received, or overlaps negotiated so as to work
out cooperation or coordination? Would these be sufficiently assertive to
count as projections of authority at all, in his view? To bolster that question,
the following sections explain the two notions of the middle on which
Lindahl might be pressed to say more: first the space in between the
collectives where neither asserts itself, even in restrained fashion, and second
the space of overlap where the assertions are not only mutual, but shared or
interdependent.
I. LINDAHL ON INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AUTHORITY
One of the key insights of Lindahl’s book is the complexity he adds to
the binary of inclusion and exclusion. In the setting of legal limits, in the
ordering of behaviors, and in the self-assertion of a putatively unified and
emplaced collective as represented by an authority, Lindahl tells us that legal
ordering—the ‘default settings for joint action’—includes while it excludes.
Yet the familiar binary of inclusion and exclusion, which is particularly
striking in the examples of emergent global legal orders that Lindahl
discusses (though is a feature of all legal ordering), is given special

ROUGHAN(DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

4/28/2019 10:46 AM

MEET ME IN THE MIDDLE?

429

complexity through his addition of relations between ‘self’ and ‘other.’
Drawing on theories of recognition to import not only cognitive but also
normative insights about self, self-relations, and inter-subjectivity, Lindahl
interlaces the inclusion/exclusion relation with the self/other relation, so that
there can be inclusion of the other as one of us or as other than us. Inclusion
thus does not necessarily assimilate and thereby collapse the otherness of
those who are included. At the same time, exclusion can be applied to both
the other and to parts of the collective self, its values, and activities, which
are deemed (via the exclusion) to fall outside of what we (the included self,
as represented by an authority) claim to stand for (see chapter six).
Lindahl interprets these practices of inclusion and exclusion as practices
of collective self-assertion, which are at the core of his model of law as
“institutionally and authoritatively mediated collective action” (IACA;
chapter two). Lindahl argues that the inevitable and at times unjustified
practices of both inclusion and exclusion—which accompany selfassertion—can be exercised with restraint, as in the examples of margins of
appreciation, doctrines of complementarity in the ICC, autonomous legal
regimes, and transnational recognition agreements. I agree with Lindahl that
these can be read as fitting examples of restraint within his IACA model of
law. They model, to varying degrees, precisely the kind of interaction that
seeks to assert control in relational space but not to assert control of that
space.
As with all institutional solutions, however, they meet their limits
wherever they meet a counter-institution, or a peer institution doing the same
thing. If there is to be any functional authority in that relational space, it
seems that on Lindahl’s model it must either be that of one or other system
asserting itself (albeit in restrained fashion); or that of an external
collective’s own self-assertion, one whose functional authority extends
precisely over the domain of ordering relations between the two (now
subsidiary) orders, and so ruling out by ruling over their plurality. In the
former, more straightforward scenario, the collective’s assertion is replaced
by a form of subjection to another authority. In such a scenario, one
collective’s restrained assertion is likely to have more functional, de facto
power, than the other; and so come to dominate the practice of interaction in
ways that make the restraint seem merely notional or even disingenuous. In
such cases, the restraint pales into the assertion. This may be as Lindahl
intends. As he has noted in our discussions of this work, his IACA model of
law involves restrained self-assertion, not assertive self-restraint.
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II. INTERACTION THAT IS NEITHER ON MY SIDE OR YOURS
Lindahl explains that, in setting the boundaries of joint action,
authorities necessarily include and exclude. That may be so, but that is not
all that they do. There is also a defensible ontology in which interaction
involves authorities stepping into the inter-authority space to meet in the
middle. That meeting may be indefinitely postponed (just as Lindahl says the
unity of a collective may be indefinitely postponed), but the key lies in the
reaching out, the invitation, the asking of this commentary’s titular question,
rather than any successful meeting being concluded.
Here, however, lies the crucial challenge. Can there be an invitation that
is not to come over to my side of the boundary, and so is not a veiled
involuntary inclusion? If so, it may be characterized not as a reaching out to
include (as in the collective self-assertion model), nor even a “holding back
to hold out” (as in the restrained variant of the model) (345, 348); it is instead
a reaching out to invite a meeting in the middle. Such an invitation is
importantly different from a full assertion of the self over the other, a full
deferral to the other, or disinterest in the other’s existence or operation.
Starting with the latter, not only would such disinterest or disengagement
amount to failure to recognize that other, but it would also be a failure on the
part of the authority to represent outwards, indeed to self-assert at all. If
authority is understood as an assertion of a putative unity of a collective and
its joint action, then some degree of projection outwards is required. Nor
must an invitation involve cooperation in a joint enterprise or joint endeavor,
which would in some sense include the other as one of us – a partner in some
project. An invitation also differs from what Lindahl describes as an
inclusion that preserves the other as other (than us) in the manner of a
cooperative but not assimilating project. Not all cooperation assimilates, just
as not all conflict excludes. There may therefore be contestations over the
question: ‘what is our joint action to be about?’ that reshape the ‘default
settings for collective action’ not by authoritative responses that include or
exclude anew, but by authorities realizing their own limitations and so
inviting representations by others; not just asserting their own limits upon
both those represented and those to whom representations are made.
There are of course plenty of ways in which an invitation could become
an inclusion or an exclusion. For instance, if one party’s material dominance
means that it invites the other to an impossible meeting, there is no real
invitation at all. An invitation that is couched in terms or with conditions that
the other side cannot meet, is similarly exclusionary. On the other hand, an
invitation to a turf that is already claimed, in order to assert that claim, is
clearly an inclusion rather than an invitation.
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Next to anticipate two potential replies. The first might suggest that,
although a collective self-assertion might indeed interact in a space that it
does not control through its own assertion, nor defer entirely to the other,
these interactions are not part of the exercise of authority for or by that
collective. They may be the exercise of some other function in which a
representative works on behalf of a collective, but does not project authority.
In my own work I have argued that normative claims to authority can be
understood to be relative, interdependent, and thus to involve interaction
between authorities that does not collapse the very existence of authority.15
In the functional+ account however, the concern becomes whether the
activities entailed in such claims to relativity still involve authoritative action
at all. I think they do, and that there is a practice of collaborative leadership
and boundary-pushing or boundary-broaching open to an authority, which
need not always project outwards through restrained assertion. I’m not sure
the same response is available to Lindahl, given his commitment to the
authority as assertion model, but anticipate he may have a better response up
his sleeve.
A second reply may be still more powerful, holding that, in any effort
to reach out (even one that is well-intentioned and made in a spirit of
generosity), an authority inevitably misrecognizes the other and so asserts
itself at least in some form. It cannot do anything else because in its
institutional form it is limited in the way it sees itself, its activities, and the
other. This is part of the logic of asymmetry, which Lindahl explains with
such care and insight. One collective’s reaching out to another is inevitably
a projection of its own settings and standards for behavior (and its standards
for recognition itself), which will determine whether and how that group sees
the other and thus may count as assertion. While such settings may align with
the way the other (recognized) collective sees itself, it cannot be the same as
its self-representation and self-assertion. Thus what might appear as an
invitation still operates as an inclusion of the other, as other, but an inclusion
nonetheless.
To bring this home to the idea of recognition, consider just one example
that appears in the exchanges of recognition between legal orders of settler
states and Indigenous peoples colonized by that settlement. Some of these
feature both historical and contemporary examples of the association of legal
orders, such as that involved in the relationships between the state and
Indigenous legal orders of Aotearoa New Zealand.16 Work on such

15. See ROUGHAN, supra note 12.
16. See e.g., Joseph Williams, Lex Aotearoa: An Heroic Attempt to Map the Maori Dimension in
Modern New Zealand Law, 21 WAIKATO L. REV. 1 (2013); Natalie Coates, The Recognition of Tikanga
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associations speaks to a difference between an interaction driven by
assertion, and an association involving invitation. There are of course shades
of interpretation as to how any particular example may be read to fit within
either category, and any fit must be revisable in light of ongoing practices of
(mis)recognition between collectives (and their authorities). These don’t
always entail invitations and, even when they do, they are difficult and
problematic, yet the example shows the possibility of at least the invitation
to, if not the successful fulfilment of, a meeting in the middle.17
There is a subtext here that it is possible for collectives, as represented,
to interact in good faith, with generosity, with respect for plurality of values,
cultures, conceptions of the good, ways of being, and even forms of
personhood. That may be overly optimistic or simply unrealistic in many
contexts of interaction, and it is not my case here that such willingness is
either often evident or easily realizable. The point remains, however, that
those who represent collectives may be burdened with the pursuit of such
efforts, not only to represent inwards, but to model invitational
representations outwards that are not assertive even in the most restrained
sense.
It may be that, to get around the tendency of institutional legal orders
towards closure around pre-set limits, invitations to the middle require a
degree of openness on the part of the actual agents – the persons in the roles
of authorities - and not the institutions of authority. This places an enormous
resource constraint on the actualization of such meetings, as do other factors
such as distance, communication failures, cultural or linguistic
misunderstanding (all of which can contribute to failures of recognition). It
is not my claim that such meetings will always (or even often) be practical
or possible, but the issuing of invitations is not precluded by such constraints.
To see how all this is possible is to look beyond bare institutional tools
for ordering the interaction of legal regimes. I leave it for others here (and
elsewhere) to evaluate the potential and potency of institutional or interinstitutional forms, rules, and institutions designed to regulate interactions,

in the Common Law of New Zealand, N.Z. L. REV. 1 (2015); Nicole Roughan, The Association of State
and Indigenous Law: A Case Study in ‘Legal Association’, 9 U. TORONTO L.J. 135 (2009).
17. Contemporary developments in the example of the association in Aotearoa New Zealand
include statutory recognition of the personhood of a river and national park, to match their recognition as
persons in Indigenous law. For analysis see e.g., Katherine Sanders, ‘Beyond Human Ownership’?
Property, Power and Legal Personality for Nature in Aotearoa New Zealand, 30 J. ENVTL. L. 207
(2018). Others may take more critical assessments of these contemporary practices that I regard as
invitational. For example, there is an argument that any kind of statutory form that gives effect to a
relationship of recognition, or any form of common law reasoning that embraces Indigenous law, is
inevitably an assertion of the state’s legal order and not an invitation to the middle. I would respond that
in substance, contemporary examples of such practices are more invitational than assertive.
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and instead look at the first-person singular perspective of those who are
doing the ordering: in whose hands the institutions are being operated and
applied, in whose practices the collectives are being represented to have
putative unity of both identity and action, and in whose names the invitations
outwards are most plausibly issued.
Both of these points show the crucial role to be played by the persons
who fill the roles of authorities, something which Lindahl’s first-person
plural perspective of represented collectives does not directly address.
III. THE OVERLAPPING MIDDLE: PLURAL SUBJECTS
The second kind of middle from which to challenge the restrained
collective self-assertion model is perhaps more important. It is also easier to
conceptualize as it does not turn upon an admittedly fine distinction between
restrained assertion and invitation (as above). This middle turns attention
away from represented collectives, and their invitations to meetings and
forms of exchange/interaction that neither controls, to the persons subject to
the representations (the persons who are included in the putative unities of a
collective, willingly or otherwise).
This second challenge to Lindahl is that there are people who are not
straightforwardly just included or excluded, rather they may be doubly
included by being subjected to (and not merely affected by) the inclusive
claims of more than one collective. In that context, the worry is not a
separation or gap between the assertions of authority creating a space for
invitations, rather the opposite: there is an overlap. That overlap renders
plural subjects - not in Gilbert’s sense of the collective subjects of a single
authority - but rather persons who are plurally or multiply subject to
authorities. Furthermore, and importantly, such plurality of subjection may
have value for the subject, such that a failure on the part of one authority to
recognize the plurality is a failure to recognize a matter of value for the
subject – and arguably in turn a failure to recognize the subject herself.18
One way of understanding the point, in Lindahl’s own terminology, is
to suggest that the restraint in restrained collective self-assertion needs to
operate inwards as well as outwards – so that the boundary-setting that
includes does so with sensitivity to the likelihood and implications of shared
subjects. Lindahl argues that the representation of a collective - the inevitable
incident of authority - is to represent it as a unity. Arguably, even if that is
18. The connection between recognition of the person, recognition of values the person holds, and
recognition of the value of the person, is controversial. See, for example, the analyses offered in JOSEPH
RAZ, VALUE, RESPECT, AND ATTACHMENT (2001); Arto Laitinen, Interpersonal Recognition: A
Response to Value or a Precondition of Personhood?, 45 INQUIRY 463 (2002); Leslie Green, Two Worries
about Respect for Persons, 120 ETHICS 212 (2010).
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the case (and I am not sure that it needs to be), a collective need not be
represented as an exclusive or sole unity for and to its own subjects.
Overlap can (but need not) create difficult practical conflicts for
subjects. For instance, conflict is created for an Indigenous person who is
functionally subject both to the authority that an Indigenous collective
asserts internally, and the authority that the state asserts when it includes that
person as a subject of its general jurisdiction. These conflicts often arise in
circumstances where the law of one order is being asserted in ways that
conflict with the other (e.g. in relation to criminal law, family law, or the
regulation of property or resources), but can equally arise when the law of
one order generates an opportunity that may conflict with the assertion of the
other (e.g. in holding the state to account under its own standards of public
or private law).19
More generally, this emphasis upon the person who is plurally subject
to authorities turns attention to the persons being recognized within
collectives and across collectives. For such persons, and concentrating on the
first-person singular for a minute, the invitation suggested in the title of this
commentary might be read as an appeal from that person to ‘her’ plural
authorities to sort themselves out, to meet in the middle, so as not to
misrecognize her by including her in their assertions of collective and
putative unity without regard for her inclusion in the other. The subject
herself asks, and perhaps may rightfully demand, to be met by her multiple
authorities, together, in the middle ground where each asserts their authority
conscious that they are within the asserted limits of the other.20
This lens also, and importantly, opens up a worry about what this all
means for the recognition of and between those persons who are not so easily
represented as collectives, because of the absence of putatively effective
default settings for joint action. It seems that the very forms of recognition
and representation that Lindahl examines, and even asymmetrical exchanges
of recognition between them, only capture those who are plausibly
represented as members of collectives (and thus as being collective subjects
of authorities). Consider, for instance, the significance of such
representational and recognitive practices for women, which as a category
appears to fall outside of Lindahl’s own examples of emplaced and bounded
19. For instance, claims made by indigenous groups against the state but using the state’s public or
private law are sometimes thought to undermine claims to the assertion of indigenous legal ordering that
would reject the state’s ordering altogether. But see e.g., Seth Davis, American Colonialism and
Constitutional Redemption, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1751 (2017); Seth Davis, The False Promise of Fiduciary
Government, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145 (2014); Moana Jackson, Changing Realities: Unchanging
Truths, 10 AUSTL. J. OF L. & SOC’Y 115 (1994).
20. See Nicole Roughan, Polities and Relative Authorities, 16 INT’L. J. OF CONST. L. 1215, 1215−22
(2018) (capturing what I have elsewhere explained as ‘relative authority.’).
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collectives. Any effort to represent women as a putative collective, and to
authoritatively set limits or default settings for joint action, runs up against
the diversity of ‘things that ‘we’ care about’, as well as practical and
functional difficulties caused by the overlap of competing representative
claims whose plurality detracts from their efficacy. Such tentative (and not
even putatively unified) representations fall outside of Lindahl’s direct
interest in collectives that are represented effectively, and authoritative
boundaries that are in fact emplaced and operated. It may be a strength of
Lindahl’s view that it explains not only how claims and responses to
recognition play out in the authoritative politics of boundaries, but also why
claims for recognition (of value and of persons) outside of any apparently
effective (and not merely putative) collective unity are so easily dismissed
by those in authority who already have the comfortable backing of an
effective collective. In that case, however, it would be instructive to see how
Lindahl’s modelling tracks the difficulties surrounding representation,
collectivity, and assertion that are so prominent in much of feminist legal
theory and theories of recognition.21
I take it, not incidentally, that the challenges detailed here need not
derail the notion of asymmetrical recognition that Lindahl so persuasively
offers. They do, however, suggest the need to re-examine ways in which
asymmetries might include invitations to meet in the middle, and not merely
inclusions and exclusions.
IV. BEYOND THE FUNCTIONAL+ ACCOUNT
One way in which a more analytic inquisition might tackle that task is
to ask Lindahl for more clarity over the differences and relationships
between different ways of conceiving what happens between legal orders
(whether in the middle or in their own regulatory and representative spaces).
There is a difference between the ideas of symmetry and reciprocity.
Reciprocity entails that some things of value are exchanged between two
parties. Though the content of what is exchanged need not be identical nor
even symmetrical, there is at least some sense that, to be valuable, reciprocity
requires that the value of what is exchanged be comparable, vis-à-vis those
who give and those who receive. Symmetry, in contrast, need not involve an
exchange but can entail practices in parallel. Both parties doing the same
thing generates a kind of symmetry. Alternatively, symmetry might entail
one party doing the exact reverse of the other (if there is a directional practice
21. See, e.g., Nancy Fraser, Feminist Politics in the Age of Recognition: A Two-Dimensional
Approach to Gender Justice, 1 STUD. IN SOC. JUST. 23 (2007). This is to be read in light of Fraser’s
broader critiques of recognition. See, e.g., NANCY FRASER & AXEL HONNETH, REDISTRIBUTION OR
RECOGNITION? A POLITICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL EXCHANGE (2003) (debating with Honneth).
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involved, then to be truly symmetrical one must proceed in the opposite
direction to the other, creating mirror-image symmetry).
There may be relations and relational practices where the two come
apart, so that to highlight asymmetry (as Lindahl does) does not undermine
accounts of reciprocity (as he suggests). There could be, in a sense, a
reciprocal exchange of asymmetrical recognition; indeed that might be the
best way to conceive of the relationships between states and Indigenous
peoples that I have used as an example here and elsewhere. The asymmetry
of their recognition of each other is inevitable, but if recognition is also of
value for either (or both) of the orders, then it can be sought in exchange for
something of value in a reciprocal interaction.
All this talk about value, however, hints at the creeping normativism
entailed in the functional+ account, for as soon as Lindahl invites the idea of
recognition into the account of authority, it necessarily imports an evaluation
of what and whom is to be recognized. A bare functional account of
recognition might be satisfied with endorsing the various selfunderstandings of those who make claims for recognition, and a functional
authoritative response might be satisfied with setting boundaries, in light of
such claims, without having to adjudicate their value. Lindahl deliberately
stops short of testing the limits of such an account, so as to avoid the
universalizing tendencies that he associates with theories of the ‘right and
the good,’ and what he deems to be the inclusionary impulses that
accompany theories of reciprocal recognition (Chapter 4). Yet the invocation
of recognition, so central to his own account, means that the questions of
whether (and how) recognition is responsive to value cannot be avoided.
Instead the familiar challenge is the need to justify, without imperially or
universally dictating, which recognitions are to count as such.
Lindahl considers that his account of authority enriched by
asymmetrical recognition may seem disappointingly thin to a normative
theorist. Here I disagree most firmly – the account is anything but thin or
disappointing—but it raises the question of how much of the normative and
evaluative content of the idea of recognition is to be imported. The crucial
questions surrounding the richer normative notions of recognition, which
evaluate peoples’ self-understandings to see whether their recognition is
valuable or justified, will be directly relevant to the robustness of the
authoritative boundary-setting, with its exclusions and inclusions, examined
in Lindahl’s book. His work should be taken as a clear provocation to rework
the implications of such full-blown ideas of recognition into richly normative
theories of authority.

